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Abstract
The optimal design of two-part tari¤s is investigated in a dynamic
model where two rms belonging to the same supply chain invest
in R&D activities to increase the quality of the nal product. It is
shown that the replication of the vertically integrated monopolists
performance can be attained using a TPT in which the fee is a linear
function of either the upstream R&D e¤ort or product quality itself.
The possibility of relying on R&D gures appearing in the upstream
rms balance sheet is desirable as quality enhancement might not be
observable or veriable.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to design optimal contracts allowing a vertical
supply chain to exactly replicate the prot performance, R&D investments
and product quality level of a vertically integrated monopolist in a dynamic
model where quality improvement requires costly R&D e¤orts by the rms
along the vertical channel or by di¤erent divisions of the same rm under
vertical integration. Before illustrating the contents of the ensuing analysis,
I briey o¤er an overview of the context in which our contribution inserts
itself.
The downward distortion of product quality in monopoly markets is a
long-standing issue in the theory of industrial organization. The incentive
for a monopolist to undersupply quality in order to increase its own ability
of extracting surplus from consumers has been highlighted by Spence (1975)
and Mussa and Rosen (1978) and then further investigated by several other
authors.1 Quality supply has also repeatedly received attention in the elds
of operations research, marketing and management,2 where it has been often
connected with the optimal coordination of supply chains.3 The latter aspect
refers to the fact that the quality level characterising the nal product, as seen
from the consumerss viewpoint, is indeed the outcome of the contributions
(in the form of advertising or R&D) of di¤erent rms along the supply chain,
1The related literature is too large to be exhaustively accounted for. See Itoh (1983),
Maskin and Riley (1984), Besanko, Donnenfeld and White (1987) and Champsaur and
Rochet (1989), inter alia. For a survey, see Lambertini (2006).
2The bulk of the related literature is summarised in Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994)
and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2004).
3In these disciplines, product quality is sometimes treated as an equivalent of goodwill
(brand equity) or the demand level, as in El Ouardighi and Pasin (2006), El Ouardighi and
Kim (2008) and Matsubayashi and Yamada (2008); other times it is treated as a hedonic
feature of the product as seen from the consumersstandpoint, as in Shi, Liu and Petruzzi
(2013).
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or di¤erent divisions of the same rm in the case of vertical integration.
This particular aspect links the discussion about quality supply to a paral-
lel debate concerning rmsmake-or-buy decisions or, equivalently, the choice
between carrying out production and R&D in house and outsourcing, with
the related contractual problems which obviously accompany the latter, any
time some relevant feature of the component being outsourced is subject to
opportunistic behaviour (i.e., moral hazard) on the part of the OEM sup-
plier. When this happens, with the supplier underinvesting along some key
dimension, a hold-up problem obtains, to the disadvantage of the outsourcing
rm facing the nal customers.4
Here, I compare a vertically integrated monopolist with two divisions in-
vesting to increase product quality versus the alternative industry structure
in which the product quality level is the outcome of the e¤orts of two in-
dependent rms connected along a vertical supply chain. In the latter case,
the contractual relation takes the form of a two-part tari¤ which may be
designed in several alternative ways, thereby generating di¤erent outcomes.
The model is dened in continuous time, over an innite horizon. It is there-
fore an optimal control model when a vertically integrated rm is considered,
and a di¤erential game with sequential moves at every instant if instead two
independent rms are assumed to exist along the supply chain. From an an-
alytical point of view, the procedure follows the same steps as in Lambertini
(2014), where an analogous approach is used to design optimal contracts in
a supply chain where rms have to build up goodwill over time.5
The main results can be spelled out as follows. After characterising the
4The hold-up phenomenon arising under opportunistic behaviour is a major issue in the
theory of the rm ever since Williamson (1975, 1979) and has been extensively discussed in
contract theory. See Hart and Moore (1988), Rogerson (1992), MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995), inter alia.
5Lambertini (2014) nests into a large literature discussing the dynamics of brand equity
and the use of two-part tari¤s, from Jeuland and Shugan (1983) to Zaccour (2008).
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e¢ cient outcome engendered by the vertically integrated rm, the distortion
induced by vertical separation is illustrated, to the e¤ect that the sum of up-
stream and downstream R&D e¤orts do not match those taking place across
divisions belonging to an integrated monopolist, and equilibrium quality con-
sequently decreases. Then, it is shown that a two-part tari¤ consisting of an
exogenously given fee combined with a wholesale price set at marginal cost
creates a hold-up problem inducing the upstream rm not to invest at all
in quality-increasing activities. As a consequence, the vertical channel falls
short of the performance of the vertically integrated monopolist, which is
instead attained modelling the xed fee as an endogenous function of either
(i) the R&D e¤ort of the upstream rm, or (ii) the quality level itself. While
being equally e¤ective at rst sight, these two alternative contractual de-
signs may indeed be not entirely equivalent. This is because the quality level
being developed along the supply chain may not be observable or veriable
along the chain itself (as well as by the nal customer before purchasing),
and therefore the alternative contract based on the R&D e¤ort - which can
be veried from the balance sheet of the upstream rm, unless fraudulent
behaviour is adopted by the latter - appears more reliable an instrument to
cope with the issue represented by the vertical externality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup and the
analysis of the vertically integrated monopolist are in Section 2. The case
of vertical separation with double marginalization is dealt with in Section 3,
while Section 4 contains the analysis of the alternative contractual designs
based on three di¤erent denitions of the two-part tari¤. Concluding remarks
are in Section 5.
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2 Benchmark: the vertically integrated mo-
nopolist
The model is a variation on the setup introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). We assume the market is supplied by
a single-product monopoly selling a nondurable good of quality q (t) > 0 at
price p (t) > 0 over continuous time t 2 [0;1) : The population of consumers
is characterised by a level of marginal willingness to pay for quality  2
[  1;] ; where  > 1, and is distributed with a uniform density d = 1
over such interval. Hence, the total mass of consumers amounts to 1. Net
consumer surplus is u = q (t)   p (t)  0; so that parameter  can be
interpreted as a proxy of income or wealth. At any time t 2 [0;1) ; partial
market coverage is assumed. The marginal consumer is identied by the
marginal willingness to pay b solving bq (t)  p (t) = 0; hence, b = p (t) =q (t)
and - assuming p (t) =q (t) >   1 always - market demand at any time t is
x (t) =   p (t) =q (t) :
Production takes place at marginal cost c, which can be normalised to zero
without further loss of generality. The rm consists of two vertically related
divisions, U (for upstream) and D (for downstream), each investing in R&D
aimed at improving the quality level of the product supplied to consumers.
Dene as ki (t) the instantaneous e¤ort of division i = D;U: If R&D activity
takes place at decreasing returns to scale, the total cost function borne by
the rm is
C (t) = b

k2U (t) + k
2
D (t)

(1)
where b is a positive parameter. One can imagine the present setup as de-
scribing a situation in which each division cares for an input or component
whose quality is crucial in determining the overall quality level of the nal
consumption good. The state dynamics describing the evolution of the state
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variable q (t) over time is
dq (t)
dt
 q = z [kU (t) + kD (t)]  q (t) (2)
in which z is a positive constant and  > 0 is the decay rate of quality.
The transfer price along the supply chain being nil, the vertically integrated
monopolists instantaneous prots are
 (t) = p (t)

  p (t)
q (t)

  b k2U (t) + k2D (t) (3)
and the rm wants to maximise the discounted prot ow
(t) =
Z 1
0
 (t) e tdt (4)
w.r.t. controls p (t), kU (t) and kD (t) ; under the constraints posed by the
state equation (2), initial condition q (0) = q0 > 0; and the appropriate
transversality condition to be specied below. Prots are discounted at the
constant rate  > 0.
The Bellman equation is
VV I (q (t)) = max
p(t);kU (t);kD(t)

 (t) + V 0V I (q (t)) 
dq (t)
dt

(5)
where subscript V I mnemonics for vertical integration and V 0V I (q (t)) 
@VV I (q (t)) =@q (t). In the remainder, I pose VV I (q (t)) = q (t) + ; so that
V 0V I (q (t)) = . Taking the rst order conditions (FOCs) on fp (t) ; ku (t) ; kd (t)g
and solving, one obtains the following triple of optimal feedback controls:
p (t) =
q (t)
2
; kU (t) =
zV 0V I (q (t))
2b
= kD (t) (6)
Plugging (6) into (5) and simplifying, one obtains the following equation:
q (t)

b
 
2   4 ( + )+ 2  z22   2b = 0 (7)
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with the system of Riccati equations
b2   4b ( + ) = 0
z22   2b = 0 (8)
being solved by  = 2= [4 ( + )] and  = z22= (2b). Accordingly, op-
timal symmetric R&D controls can be rewritten as k = z2= [8b ( + )] ;
and the resulting steady state quality level is q = z22= [4b ( + )]. The
remaining equilibrium magnitudes are p = z23= [8b ( + )] ; x = =2
and  = z24 ( + 2) =

32b ( + )2

.
3 Vertical separation: the e¤ect of double
marginalization
Now I illustrate the game in which U and D are independent rms playing
noncooperatively, with the upstream rm endogenously setting a wholesale
price w (t) when selling each unit of its part or component to rm D, which
then combines it with its own one and then sells the nal good to consumers
on the market. The two rmsinstantaneous prot functions are (henceforth,
the time argument is omitted for the sake of brevity):
U = wx  bk2U ; D = (p  w)x  bk2D (9)
Firm U controls w and kU ; rm D controls p and kD. Their respective
Bellman equations are:
VU (q) = max
w;kU

U + V
0
U (q) 
dq
dt

(10)
VD (q) = max
p;kD

D + V
0
D (q) 
dq
dt

(11)
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Proceeding by backward induction, I take w and kU as given and solve
rm Ds optimum problem. The relevant FOCs on controls p and kD yield:
pV S =
q + w
2
; kV SD =
zV 0D (q)
2b
(12)
where superscript V S stands for vertical separation. Controls (12) can be
substituted into (10) together with VD (q) = q (t) + " and V 0D (q) = ; in
such a way that (10) can be rewritten as follows:
VU (q) = max
w;kU (t)

(q   w)w
2q
  bk2U +
V 0U (q) [z
2 + 2b (zkU   q)]
2b

(13)
This generates the following FOCs:

2
  w
q
= 0
zV 0U (q)  2bkU = 0
(14)
which deliver wV S = q=2 and kV SU = zV
0
U (q) = (2b). Then, posing VU (q) =
q + ; so that V 0U (q) = ; the two Bellman equations simplify as follows:
bq [8 ( + )   2] + 8b  2z2 (2 + )
8b
= 0 (15)
for rm U; and
bq [16 ( + )   2] + 16b"  4z2 ( + 2)
16b
= 0 (16)
for rm D. The unique solution of the system of four Riccati equations
associated with (15-16) is
 =
2
16 ( + )
;  =
2
8 ( + )
; " =
5z24
1024b ( + ) 
;  =
z24
128b ( + ) 
(17)
and the equilibrium levels of R&D e¤orts and product quality are, respec-
tively:
kV SU =
z2
16b ( + )
; kV SD =
z2
32b ( + )
; qV S =
3z22
32b ( + )
(18)
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with kV SU + k
V S
D < 2k
 and consequently also qV S < q. Additionally, output
xV S = =4 = x=2. As a result, equilibrium channel prots
V S =
z24 (12 + 18)
1024b ( + )2
(19)
are lower than . The analysis carried out in this section entails the follow-
ing:
Proposition 1 The double marginalization associated with vertical separa-
tion brings about a reduction in R&D e¤orts, quality level and channel prots
as compared to the vertically integrated solution.
However, it is also worth noting that, although a hold-up e¤ect is indeed
operating because kV Si < k
; i = U;D, it is nonetheless true that kV SU = 2k
V S
D ;
a property which is spelled out in
Corollary 2 Vertical separation and double marginalization lead the up-
stream rm to invest twice as much as the downstream rm.
The reason driving this result lies in the fact that rm U has an incentive
to increase quality to keep output unaltered while at the same time driving
upward the input price wV S; both variables inuencing positively its revenues.
4 Two-part tari¤s
A subset of the extant literature on supply chains where product quality
is explicitly treated as a relevant feature of the channels performance (see
Economides, 1999; Bacchiega and Bonroy, 2015, inter alia) relies on the adop-
tion of a Nash bargaining solution to design the allocation of prots along the
channel itself, showing that this route fails to deliver the same total prots
as the vertically integrated solution.
Here I rely on alternative denitions of a contract based on two-part tari¤s
to illustrate a twofold result:
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 the traditional two-part tari¤ consisting of a xed fee associated with a
wholesale price does not allow the vertically separated rms to repro-
duce the performance of the vertically integrated monopolist. Instead,
this can be achieved by adopting, alternatively,
 a control-linear two-part tari¤ (where the control at stake is rm Us
R&D e¤ort).
In both cases, the fee is accompanied by a wholesale price set at marginal
production cost. As mentioned above, the second result is relevant in that
the quality level may not be immediately observable or veriable by the
downstream rm, which would therefore be subject to the risk associated
with opportunistic behaviour in the form of underinvestment on the part
of the upstream rm. To complement the analysis, I also show that the
replication of the vertically integrated outcome can indeed be attained by
setting the xed part of the tari¤ as a linear function of quality - in which
case the aforementioned caveat should be kept in mind.
4.1 The exogenous two-part tari¤
Here I consider the case in which the vertical relation between separated
rms U and D takes the form of a classicaltwo-part tari¤ T = wx + F .
The resulting instantaneous objective functions are therefore the following:
U = wx+ F   bk2U ; D = (p  w)x  F   bk2D (20)
where the xed component F of the TPT is an exogenous parameter, accom-
panied by a wholesale price equal to marginal production cost, w = 0.
The FOCs pertaining to rm D yield the same controls as in (12). Now,
posing w = 0, VD (q) = q + " and V 0D (q) =  and proceeding as in the pre-
vious section, it is easily veried that, since U = F   bk2U ; the optimal R&D
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e¤ort by rm U solving its rst order condition is again kFU = zV
0
U (q) = (2b),
superscript F indicating the adoption of a TPT with an exogenous fee.
The partial derivative of the downstream rms value function is again
V 0U (q) = . However, rm Us Bellman equations simplies as follows:
z2 [2 + 2 ( + )]  8b ( + ) [+ q ( + )  F ]
8b ( + )
= 0 (21)
whereby one of the two Riccati equation generated by (21) is
8bq ( + )2 = 0 (22)
which implies  = 0; so that V 0U (q) = 0 and therefore also k
F
U = 0. This
shows that the exogeneity of the xed fee appearing in the tari¤ altogether
eliminates any R&D incentive upstream. It is also worth stressing that,
typically, F should be posed equal to
px =
z24
16b ( + )
(23)
in order for the upstream rm to appropriate the revenues generated by sales,
but this of course wouldnt do the job of restoring R&D incentives upstream
either.
Accordingly, we may claim:
Proposition 3 The adoption of a classical TPT of the form T = wx + F
altogether eliminates the upstream rms incentive to invest in product quality
improvement.
That is, here the classical hold-up problem emerges upstream in its en-
tirety, being clearly generated by the presence of a xed fee transferring up-
wards the whole of rm Ds revenues. Firm Ds investment being kFD = k
;
the resulting steady state quality level is qF = z22= [8b ( + )] = q=2.
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4.2 The control-linear two-part tari¤
The denition of the two-part tari¤ is the same as in the previous case.
Therefore, the instantaneous prot functions are as in (20). In this case,
however, I will pose F =  +  kU . Hence, all of the relevant variables and
prots will be identied by a superscript kU revealing that the TPT specied
in the contract is a function of the upstream rms R&D control. Setting w =
0; the optimal controls of rm D are pV S = q=2 and k
kU
D = zV
0
D (q) = (2b).
Specifying the upstream rms value function as VD (q) = q+ " and solving
the resulting system w.r.t.  and "; we obtain:
 =
2
4 ( + )
; " =
z24 + 16b ( + ) [zkU
2   4F ( + )]
64b ( + )2
(24)
Now dene F =  +  kU and proceed backward to the Bellman equa-
tion of the upstream rm, to take the FOC on kU , which delivers k
kU
U =
(zV 0U (q) +  ) = (2b). Conjecturing VU (q) = q + ; the resulting system of
Riccati equations is solved by  = 0 and  =
 
4b+  2

= (4b) ; and the
state equation simplify as follows:

q =
z [z2 + 4 ( + ) ]
8b ( + )
  q (25)
whereby the equilibrium quality level is
qkUU =
z [z2 + 4 ( + ) ]
8b ( + )
(26)
It is then immediate to check that kkUU =  = (2b) and k
kU
D = k
: Hence,
we have that kkUU = k
 and kUU + 
kU
D = 
 at  = z2=4 ( + ). Firms
prots in steady state are:
kUU =
z24
64b ( + )2
+  ; kUD =
z24 ( + 4)
64b ( + )2
   (27)
with
kUD  08 2

0;
z24 ( + 4)
64b ( + )2

This analysis boils down to the following:
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Proposition 4 A two-part tari¤ TPT = wx+ F; with F = +  kU ;
 2

0;
z24 ( + 4)
64b ( + )2

and  = z2=4 ( + ) allows the vertically separated industry to reproduce
the same performance attained by the vertically integrated monopolist.
4.3 The state-linear two-part tari¤
A natural way out of the problem outlined above consists in dening the fee
F as a linear function of the quality level, i.e., F =  +  q, coupled with
w = 0.6 Of course, this solution can be pursued as long as the quality level of
the component or intermediate good supplied by U to D is observable by D.
If not (or, if it is veriable after a signicant lag), then such a contract will
not be, in general, a solution to the aforementioned hold-up problem. State
and control variables, as well as output and prots will carry superscript q
to recall that the TPT is a function of the quality level.
For the moment, I keep F as exogenous and just set w = 0. The maximum
problem of rm D is solved by (12), with w = 0. Then, posing VD (q) =
q (t) + " and V 0D (q) =  and taking kU as given, the Bellman equation of
rm D is solved by the pair (; ") solving the following system of Riccati
equations:
2   4 ( + ) = 0
z22   4b (F   zkU + ") = 0
(28)
System (28) delivers
" =
 (4z2 + 4bkU)  4bF
4b
;  =
2
4 ( + )
(29)
6This is the standard approach to obtain (degenerate) Markovian equilibria in Stack-
elberg di¤erential games where the leaders policy is taken to be a linear function of the
relevant state variable (see Dockner et al. 2000, pp. 134-41).
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The downstream rms prot simplies as follows:
qD =
2q
4
  z
24
64b ( + )2
  F (30)
and it is nil in correspondence of
F =
2q
4
  z
24
64b ( + )2
(31)
The expressions appearing in (29) and (31) can be substituted into the Bell-
man equation of the upstream rm, which generates a FOC w.r.t. kU de-
livering the by now familiar result kqU = zV
0
U (q) = (2b). Assuming again
VU (q) = q + ; the Bellman equation of rm U produces the following
system:
4 ( + ) 2 = 0 (32)
64b ( + )2   z2 162  2 + 2+ 8  2 ( + ) + 4 4 = 0 (33)
whose unique solution is identied by the pair
 =
2
4 ( + )
;  =
z24
32b ( + )2
(34)
At this point it is quickly checked that q = q; kqU = k
q
D = k
; xq = x and
qU + 
q
D = 
. Accordingly, I may formulate
Proposition 5 If the fee appearing in the TPT is (i) linear in the quality
level and (ii) extracts the full surplus from the pockets of the downstream rm,
the equilibrium attained under vertical separation replicates the performance
of the vertically integrated monopolist.
Although apparently this type of contract produces the same equilibrium
as the one based on a TPT linear in the upstream rms control, the approach
illustrated in this section is somewhat problematic as it leaves room to a
moral hazard problem. If any given quality increase along the supply chain
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is veriable (and therefore contractible), then the TPT incorporating (31)
represents a feasible e¢ cient solution to the hold-up problem. If not, (31) is a
gamble the downstream rm should not be willing to accept as it exposes the
same rm to an obvious opportunistic behaviour on the part of the upstream
supplier.
5 Concluding remarks
I have investigated the e¢ cient design of the contract based on a two-part
tari¤ that should be adopted to lead a supply chain along which quality-
improving investments take place to entirely replicate the performance of a
vertically integrated rm. In particular, the foregoing analysis has shown that
there exist two alternative specication of the TPT achieving this outcome:
one contemplates a fee dened as a linear function of the upstream R&D
endeavour, the other has the fee specied as a linear function of product
quality. The latter might not be a feasible solution if quality improvements
along the vertical relation are not immediately observable/veriable, and
therefore not contractible, while the adoption of the former hinges upon
reliable nancial reports on the part of the upstream OEM rm.
Several extensions of the above analysis can be envisaged. First of all,
the setup can be extended to allow for oligopolistic competition to take place
either downstream or upstream, or in both. Secondly, the presence of some
other type of investment, e.g., in cost-reducing innovation, could also be ac-
counted for, as in Lambertini and Orsini (2000; 2015). Thirdly, here I have
conned my attention to nondurables; using the same approach to analysing
contractual design based on TPTs for durables looks like a natural adden-
dum. These tasks are left for future research.
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